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.These, described and exaggerated by the lively and hu-morous, though coarse and rustic eloquence of Dr.Mandeville, have thrown uponhis doctrines an air of truth and probability which is very apt to impose upon theunskilful.Dr.Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of propriety, from7a regard to what is commendable and praise-worthy, as being done from a loveof praise and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity.Man, he observes,is naturally much more interested in his own happiness than in that of others,and it is impossible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their prosperity tohis own.Whenever he appears to do so, we may be assured that he imposesupon us, and that he is then acting from the same selfish motives as at all othertimes.Among his other selfish passions, vanity is one of the strongest, and he isalways easily flattered and greatly delighted with the applauses of those about him.When he appears to sacrifice his own interest to that of his companions, he knowsthat his conduct will be highly agreeable to their self-love, and that they willnot fail to express their satisfaction by bestowing upon him the most extravagantpraises.The pleasure which he expects from this, over-balances, in his opinion,the interest which he abandons in order to procure it.His conduct, therefore, uponthis occasion, is in reality just as selfish, and arises from just as mean a motive, asupon any other.He is flattered, however, and he flatters himself, with the beliefthat it is entirely disinterested; since, unless this was supposed, it would not seemto merit any commendation either in his own eyes or in those of others.All publicspirit, therefore, all preference of public to private interest, is, according to him,a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and that human virtue which is somuch boasted of, and which is the occasion of so much emulation among men, isthe mere offspring of flattery begot upon pride.Whether the most generous and public-spirited actions may not, in some sense,8be regarded as proceeding from self-love, I shall not at present examine.The de-cision of this question is not, I apprehend, of any importance towards establishingthe reality of virtue, since self-love may frequently be a virtuous motive of action.I shall only endeavour to show that the desire of doing what is honourable andnoble, of rendering ourselves the proper objects of esteem and approbation, can-not with any propriety be called vanity.Even the love of well-grounded fame andVII.ii.4 281 The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smithreputation, the desire of acquiring esteem by what is really estimable, does notdeserve that name.The first is the love of virtue, the noblest and the best passionin human nature.The second is the love of true glory, a passion inferior no doubtto the former, but which in dignity appears to come immediately after it.He isguilty of vanity who desires praise for qualities which are either not praise-worthyin any degree, or not in that degree in which he expects to be praised for them;who sets his character upon the frivolous ornaments of dress and equipage, orupon the equally frivolous accomplishments of ordinary behaviour.He is guiltyof vanity who desires praise for what indeed very well deserves it, but what heperfectly knows does not belong to him.The empty coxcomb who gives himselfairs of importance which he has no title to, the silly liar who assumes the merit ofadventures which never happened, the foolish plagiary who gives himself out forthe author of what he has no pretensions to, are properly accused of this passion.He too is said to be guilty of vanity who is not contented with the silent sentimentsof esteem and approbation, who seems to be fonder of their noisy expressions andacclamations than of the sentiments themselves, who is never satisfied but whenhis own praises are ringing in his ears, and who solicits with the most anxious im-portunity all external marks of respect, is fond of titles, of compliments, of beingvisited, of being attended, of being taken notice of in public places with the ap-pearance of deference and attention
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