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.11).However, insmaller counties, responsibility resides either with an interagency taskforce or with law enforcement.Somewhat unsettling was the result that14 percent of local law enforcement agencies indicated that they didnot know who was responsible for developing such contingency plansfor their jurisdiction.Almost all local agencies (89 percent, S.E.5)reported that these contingency plans were designed for multiagencyuse (not shown).At the state level, responsibility for developing contingency planstends to reside primarily with law enforcement (Table 3.11).Most statelaw enforcement agencies (95 percent, S.E.2) indicated such contin-gency plans were designed for multiagency use (not shown).With respect to mutual aid, most local law enforcement agencies(92 percent, S.E.4) (not shown) have some form of mutual aid agree-ments with other city, county, regional, or state organizations for emer-gency response.However, relatively few local law enforcement agencies(about one out of ten) updated their existing mutual aid agreements orestablished new agreements in the year following 9/11 to specificallyaddress emergency response for terrorist-related incidents (Table 3.12).This result could reflect less active engagement in updating mutual aidagreements at the local level, or perhaps many local law enforcementagencies feel that existing mutual aid agreements are sufficient to ad-dress their support needs for terrorist-related incidents as well.In general, more law enforcement agencies in large counties estab-lished new mutual aid agreements following 9/11 for terrorist-related Preparedness Results for Law Enforcement Agencies 47Table 3.11Are Law Enforcement Agencies Responsible for Developing TerrorismContingency Response Plans for Their Jurisdiction or State?State Law Local LawEnforcement EnforcementAll Local LE Orgs.(%)All StateResponsible? LE Orgs.(%) Overall Metro Non-MetroYes, department is60 (4) 36 (9) 60 (12) 30 (10)responsibleNo, an interagency task18 (3) 40 (12) 23 (9) 44 (15)force isNo, fire department is 3 (3) 5 (3) 3 (2) 6 (4)No, another local/state16 (6) 5 (3) 4 (2) 5 (4)agency IsDon t know who Is3 (3) 14 (7) 10 (4) 15 (8)responsibleStandard error of the estimate shown in parentheses.incidents than did agencies in smaller counties (30 percent versus 7 per-cent) (Table 3.12).These results likely understate the amount of up-dating of mutual aid agreements done by law enforcement after 9/11,because we only asked about terrorist-related incidents; we did not askif their departments had updated agreements for emergency response ingeneral (i.e., consistent with an all-hazards approach to preparedness).Although at the local level few agencies updated their mutualaid agreements following 9/11, local law enforcement appeared to besomewhat more proactive in updating their response plans or standardoperating procedures (SOPs).One-third of law enforcement agenciesin large counties and one-third of those in smaller counties updatedtheir response plans primarily to address CBR-related incidents.21Similar to local law enforcement, most state law enforcementagencies (85 percent, S.E.3) already had some form of mutual aidagreements in place for emergency response in general (not shown).However, state law enforcement agencies were more actively engaged21Although not shown, only 3 percent of local law enforcement agencies updated their re-sponse plans for agroterrorism-related incidents, and even fewer (less than 1 percent) had doneso for cyberterrorism. 48 When Terrorism Hits HomeTable 3.12Since 9/11, Have Law Enforcement Agencies Updated Their Mutual Aid Agree-ments or Response Plans Specifically to Address Terrorism-Related Incidents?State Law Local LawEnforcement EnforcementAll Local LE Orgs.(%)Updated Mutual-Aid All State LEAgreements? Orgs.(%) Overall Metro Non-MetroUpdated existing mutual 33 (5) 12 (5) 10 (4) 13 (6)aid agreementsEstablished new mutual 27 (5) 11 (6) 30 (16) 7 (5)aid agreementsUpdated Plans? Overall Metro Non-MetroYes 69 (4) 27 (7) 33 (10) 25 (8)Standard error of the estimate shown in parentheses.in updating these agreements and their response plans.In response to9/11, 69 percent of state law enforcement agencies updated their re-sponse plans or SOPs, as compared to only 27 percent of local lawenforcement agencies.Also, about one-third of state law enforcementagencies updated their mutual aid agreements, and another third es-tablished new agreements to specifically address response to terrorist-related incidents (Table 3.12).Training and ExercisesLaw enforcement agencies can receive counterterrorism or antiterror-ism training from a variety of sources, including ODP, the FBI, otherfederal agencies, private or nonprofit organizations, university pro-grams, state government, or their police academy.We asked about lawenforcement s training activities in several areas: (1) receipt of coun-terterrorism training from the FBI s JTTFs, and awareness of coun-terterrorism training being offered by their police academy or stategovernment; (2) participation in interagency task forces in tabletop orfield exercises; (3) participation of their department s specialized terror- Preparedness Results for Law Enforcement Agencies 49ism unit in joint training; and (4) participation in federally-sponsoredtraining and equipment programs.As noted earlier in this chapter, a number of local law enforce-ment agencies (particularly those in large counties) had received coun-terterrorism training from the FBI s JTTFs (see Table 3.5).However,relatively few state law enforcement agencies had received such trainingfrom the JTTFs, suggesting that these state-level organizations soughtcounterterrorism training from other sources.Law enforcement agencies varied in their awareness of whethercounterterrorism training was offered by their police academy or bythe state.Whereas the JTTFs appear to be an oft-cited source of coun-terterrorism training at the local level, relatively few local law enforce-ment agencies (1 out of 20) reported that their police academy offeredsuch training (Table 3.13)
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