[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.With a few exceptions like the MNCs and the agricul-tural associations, most lobby groups lacked any experience and infrastruc-ture for cross-border lobby activities.They felt uncertain and looked forhelp from their central government.This feeling has largely disappeared inthe fifteen old member-states, but still exists in the new member-states.128 pushing the buttons of brussels Although all central governments still maintain such a procedure for national co-ordination at the highest level (Cabinet, Prime Minister orPresident) [Kassim and others, 2000 and 2001; Wessels and others, 2003],they have found that it has become a quagmire [Peters and Wright, 2001]or Byzantine mechanism [Schneider and Baltz, 2005] that takes manyplayers, interests, conflicts and time.Since the early 1990s, central govern-ments hardly co-ordinate their own level effectively, not to mention the restof their society, [Van Schendelen, 1993].In usually only four cases they atleast try to co-ordinate their influence on the EU, as part of their upstreamvector: (a) if for upcoming Council meetings the national voting positionhas to be formalised, (b) if the national parliament pressures for a commonposition on some issue, (c) if there are heavy interdepartmental conflictsover an issue and (d) if the government still holds veto power in the Council.Even in these cases the attempt at co-ordination often comes closer to thecreation of coherency between different views of ministries on paper thanto the co-ordination of their behaviour, and thus it largely remains symbolicco-ordination.Besides, the rest of society is hardly invited to participate,making it not national.The specialised ministry usually frames the votingposition for the Council long beforehand, during the Commission phase.Most national parliaments receive symbols of coherency like solemn state-ments, promises and considerations rather than indicators of co-ordina-tion.Conflicting ministries frequently prefer their common interest not tobecome co-ordinated centrally.Only in the case of a Council veto positioncan the central co-ordination, if attempted, be really effective in blocking anundesired outcome, but not for pushing a desired one.Due to the power ofveto, the blocking could however also be achieved without co-ordination.The growing new practice can be summarised by the catchword self-reliance [Van Schendelen, 1993].Public or private pressure groups may liketo co-ordinate others actively, but they abhor being co-ordinated by otherspassively.Those having a specific interest increasingly prefer to act on theirown.This is the case with all sorts of interest groups, even those that other-wise preach co-ordination.Many trade associations wishing to co-ordinatetheir members prefer to bypass their national umbrella, and units of min-istries often find their way to Brussels long before informing their co-ordi-nating office.Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which in most countries arecharged with the dual task of both central government EU co-ordinationand their foreign policy-making, frequently act self-reliantly at the EU levelon their second concern.Already in the early 1990s, even from France, for-mally a most centralised country, more than one hundred interest groups,including units of central government, escaped their central co-ordinatingstructural trends in the management of eu affairs 129 office SGCI (under the Foreign Ministry), since 2005 re-positioned asSGAE (under the Prime Minister), by setting up their own lobby office inBrussels [Legendre, 1993], discretely called information bureau.In mostcountries national co-ordination is now almost only requested by the na-tional parliament wanting to bind the government formally, by the leadingministry wanting to control other ministries and by mass media smellingconflicts.The trend of self-reliance, found among all sorts of interest groups, justi-fies the view that the EU is not a collection of member states but of membercountries.The trend can be explained as a rational response of lobby groupsto the challenge of finding more efficient and effective road-mapping or nav-igation from home to EU, particularly for the following four reasons.(1) Domestic divisions on every EU issue is the natural state of affairs inevery member country, more nicely phrased as pluralistic or democratic.The country or society always contains many more varied interests than thestate alone, and the latter more than the central government which is inter-nally divided.Where no national interest exists, defined as shared by all athome , there cannot be national co-ordination.No domestic lobby groupcan trust that its central government will back just its interests.By denyingpluralism at home, a central government willy-nilly stimulates many do-mestic stakeholders to look after their EU interests self-reliantly.By exclud-ing decentralised governments and private lobby groups from its co-ordi-nation, the central government legitimises their self-reliance even more.(2) The benefits of national co-ordination can only exist if the Councilplays a crucial role and if the central government s position can make thedifference there.As shown in the previous chapter, the Council usuallyplays a formally decisive role in only the last phase of about 15% of EU legis-lation.Under the QMV voting practice, a single member state rarely makesa difference anyhow.In the drafting and delegated phases of EU legislation,the position of central government is even weaker.(3) The costs of national co-ordination can be enormous.A public or pri-vate lobby group relying on it runs all the risks of, for example, losing itscase already there, mobilising opponents early, diluting its interests withheterogeneous other ones, being too late in the Commission phase or miss-ing a rising European coalition.(4) The alternative benefits of self-reliance usually outbalance both itscosts and the cost-benefit ratio of national co-ordination.This refers to theaforementioned factors of participation at the EU level.Every lobby groupcan get presentation or representation there.Competitors on its market orpolicy domain, frequently being already there, compel it to follow.The130 pushing the buttons of brussels Commission and EP really welcome well-prepared lobby groups.This quadruple logic of self-reliance, based on considerations of efficien-cy and effectiveness, applies not only to the macro-level of central govern-ment, but also to the meso-level of national associations and even to themicro-level of public or private lobby groups.In the open and free Europeancountries almost every specific interest group has the real option of self-reliance, by escaping some overarching structure or by-passing it silently.Rarely can the parent or sister organisation prohibit this effectively.For ex-ample, a central government has few legal means to keep domestic lobbygroups at home, because private groups are free to move around and decen-tralised governments (regions, cities, agencies) usually possess some legalautonomy, which in federalised countries like Belgium, Germany andSpain is constitutionalised for regions.Figure 3.2 gives a helicopter view ofthe main routes from home to the EU playing-field, with arrows indicatingthe upstream direction.INTEREST GROUPS AND ROUTES TO EUNational EU/Transnational Foreign, e.g.Cabinet COUNCIL FR, UK &Ministries COMMISSION USAParliament PARLIAMENT JapanAdvisory bodies ESC, COR LDCsCourt COURT WTO, WHO &Pri/Pu/Ngo: Pri/Pu/Ngo:Sectoral/ ConfederationsRegional FederationsOrganisations NetworksAd-hoc issue groupsBrussels officePri/Pu/Ngo:Small/Medium-sizedBig/MultinationalPri = private / Pu = public / Ngo = non-governmentalFigure 3
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
