[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Thus, it cannot bedetermined whose memory of that meeting is more accurate Truman s or Wilson s.Fora variety of viewpoints on the subject see Harry S.Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial andHope, vol.2 (paperback ed.), 469; ESA Weekly, April 1, 1952, RG 296, Records, Reportsand Secretariat, box 3, NA; Memo for the Files, April 1, 1952, Papers of Harold L.Enarson,box 4, file: Memoranda Sept.51 July 52, HSTL; Charles E.Wilson s Own Story ofBreak with Truman, U.S.News 32 (May 2, 1952): 11 14; The Last Days of CharlieWilson, Fortune 45 (June 1952):85 86. Crises of Confidence / 167In fact, few were surprised that the president turned to John R.Steel-man as a temporary replacement for Charles Wilson.Born in Arkansasand trained as a Ph.D.economist, Steelman was a consummate behind-the-scenes Washington insider.Having first arrived in Washingtonduring the waning days of the New Deal to direct the U.S.ConciliationService, Steelman was the first person to hold the top White House staffpost, assistant to the president, which Truman had created especiallyfor him in 1946.Prior to that post, he briefly headed the Office of WarMobilization and Reconversion.And somewhat ironically, Steelmanhad preceded Stuart Symington as the acting chairman of the NationalSecurity Resources Board from 1948 through 1950 while simultaneouslycontinuing his duties as assistant to the president.Thus, after Wilson shasty exit, Truman once again turned to Steelman in a pinch becausehe trusted him implicitly and because he knew that Steelman wasat least familiar with the broad issues of industrial mobilization andeconomic stabilization issues.Furthermore, Truman realized that byApril 1952 the mobilization program was already winding down andthat Steelman would be in a caretaker role carrying out policiesalready set by his predecessors.In fact, as Steelman himself later wrote, when Wilson left.the mobilization emphasis had already shiftedfrom a sharp build-up of controls to the development of an orderly wayto decontrol. 14Thus, Steelman had little to do with the establishment of mobilizationpolicy, but his talents as a compromiser, a hardworking administrator,and sometimes a glad-hander, would serve the Truman administra-tion well as it embarked down the slippery slope of the developingsteel crisis.Truman, who had always depended upon John Steelmanto keep many balls in the air while at the same time keeping needlessdetails and bureaucratic skirmishes out of the Oval Office, hoped thathis assistant could hold the line during the crisis while he searchedfor a permanent replacement for the departed Wilson.Still, though,Steelman s brief five-month stint as acting ODM director was anythingbut easy.Most of his time was occupied with negotiations between steelFor reaction to Wilson s resignation see Memo for Mr.Steelman, April 1, 1952, Papersof Harold L.Enarson, box 3, file: Lucas Committee Amendment, HSTL; ESA Weekly,April 8, 1952, RG 296, Records, Reports and Secretariat, box 3, NA; Marcus, Truman andthe Steel Seizure Case, 282, n.76.14.Steelman and Kreager, The Executive Office as Administrative Coordinator, 688 709.For Steelman s quote, see 705; Patrick Anderson, The Presidents Men: WhiteHouse Assistants of Franklin D.Roosevelt, Harry S.Truman, Dwight D.Eisenhower, John F.Kennedy, and Lyndon B.Johnson, 92 93. 168 / Truman and Koreaexecutives and the steelworkers union.Beyond that, he became moreand more preoccupied with issues of price and material decontrol.Fur-thermore, despite Steelman s considerable clout and experience in theWhite House, he lacked a firm understanding of the details of the Ko-rean mobilization program because neither of his predecessors StuartSymington and Charles Wilson had much enjoyed sharing power, notto mention information, with other members of the administration.15During the first week of April, the steel companies offered the uniona new contract.Their terms were substantially below those recom-mended by the WSB.At the same time, administration officials told thecompanies that steel prices could be raised by $4.50 per ton.But neitherthe union nor the steel executives were mollified by the new terms, andthe stage was set for a nationwide steel strike.The United Steelworkersvoted to strike effective April 9.Truman was convinced that the steelexecutives were greedy and unreasonable.He was determined to headoff a strike and prepared to appear on national television the daybefore the strike was to begin.Meanwhile, Truman s top mobilizationofficials and Defense Secretary Robert Lovett managed to convince thepresident that a steel stoppage would not only hamper long-term rear-mament plans, but would also endanger American soldiers in Korea.Unwilling to imperil the nation s defense effort or its troops in the field,and determined to save the economic stabilization program, Trumandecided to seize the steel mills to avoid a work stoppage.16On the evening of April 8, 1952, the embattled president appearedon national television, announcing that he was seizing the nation smajor steel mills effective as of midnight.Reactions to the seizurewere instantaneous and vituperative equaled perhaps only by thereactions to Truman s firing of Douglas MacArthur a year earlier.Thesteel executives, business organizations, newspapers, magazines, andmany in Congress excoriated Truman s action as that of a dictator.Someof the president s most stalwart supporters remained conspicuouslysilent.The volley of criticism aimed at Truman was certainly not sur-prising.For Truman s political adversaries and those who viewed theKorean War as a fatal mistake sure to lead the nation toward one-man15.Anderson, The Presidents Men, 92 93; An Analysis of the Central ManagementElements of the Defense Mobilization Program, October 23, 1952, Papers of David H.Stowe, box 3, file: Organizational Study: ODM-NSRB-NPA-ESA (1952), HSTL.16.Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 384 85; Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, 7582; Truman, Memoirs, vol
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
