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.In America, the Spanish protected themselves as best they might behind masonry, unaided fromhome; while in the Mediterranean they escaped insult and injury mainly through the indifference of the Dutch,for the French and English had not yet begun to contend for mastery there.In the course of history theNetherlands, Naples, Sicily, Minorca, Havana, Manila, and Jamaica were wrenched away, at one time oranother, from this empire without a shipping.In short, while Spain's maritime impotence may have beenprimarily a symptom of her general decay, it became a marked factor in precipitating her into the abyss fromwhich she has not yet wholly emerged.CHAPTER 1.DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.21 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Except Alaska, the United States has no outlying possession, no foot of ground inaccessible by land.Itscontour is such as to present few points specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of thefrontiers can be readily attained, cheaply by water, rapidly by rail.The weakest frontier, the Pacific, is farremoved from the most dangerous of possible enemies.The internal resources are boundless as compared withpresent needs; we can live off ourselves indefinitely in our little corner, to use the expression of a Frenchofficer to the author.Yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial route through the Isthmus,the United States in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in thecommon birthright of all people, the sea.III.Extent of Territory.The last of the conditions affecting the development of a nation as a sea power, andtouching the country itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is Extent of Territory.This maybe dismissed with comparatively few words.As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of square miles which a country contains,but the length of its coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered.As to these it is to besaid that, the geographical and physical conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strengthor weakness according as the population is large or small.A country is in this like a fortress; the garrison mustbe proportioned to the enceinte.A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of Secession.Hadthe South had a people as numerous as it was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a seapower, the great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been elements of great strength.The people of the United States and the Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectivenessof the blockade of the whole Southern coast.It was a great feat, a very great feat; but it would have been animpossible feat had the Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen.What was there shown wasnot, as has been said, how such a blockade can be maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the faceof a population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers.Those who recall how the blockadewas maintained, and the class of ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan, correctunder the circumstances, could not have been carried out in the face of a real navy.Scattered unsupportedalong the coast, the United States ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments, in face of anextensive network of inland water communications which favored secret concentration of the enemy.Behindthe first line of water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong fortresses, upon either ofwhich the enemy's ships couid always fall back to elude pursuit or to receive protection.Had there been aSouthern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the scattered condition of the United States ships, the lattercould not have been distributed as they were; and being forced to concentrate for mutual support, many smallbut useful approaches would have been left open to commerce.But as the Southern coast, from its extent andmany inlets, might have been a source of strength, so, from those very characteristics, it became a fruitfulsource of injury.The great story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most striking illustration of anaction that was going on incessantly all over the South, At every breach of the sea frontier, war-ships wereentering.The streams that had carried the wealth and supported the trade of the seceding States turned againstthem, and admitted their enemies to their hearts.Dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions that might,under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive through the most exhausting war.Never did sea power play agreater or a more decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of the world's historywould be modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival States, in the North Americancontinent.But while just pride is felt in the well-earned glory of those days, and the greatness of the resultsdue to naval preponderance is admitted, Americans who understand the facts should never fail to remind theoverconfidence of their countrymen that the South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring people,but that also its population was not proportioned to the extent of the sea-coast which it had to defend.IV.Number of Population
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